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ABSTRACT
This study empirically tests the proposition that law students adopt
different conceptions of the judge's role in adjudication based on whether
they first study intentional torts, negligence, or strict liability. The authors
conducted an anonymous survey of more than 450 students enrolled in eight
law schools at the beginning, midpoint, and end of the first semester of law
school. The students were prompted to indicate to what extent they believed
the judge's role to be one of rule application and, conversely, to what extent
it was one of considering social, economic, and ideological factors. The
survey found that while all three groups of students shifted toward a belief
that judges consider social, economic, and ideological factors, the degree of
the shift differed in a statistically significant way depending on which torts
their professors taught first. These differences persisted throughout the
semester, even after the students studied other torts. Further, these
differences were observed even when the analysis controlled for law school
ranking and were more pronounced among students attending the highest
ranked schools.
In interpreting the survey results, the authors employ sociologist Erving
Goffman's theory of "frame analysis" and the work of cognitive
psychologists, including Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, on
"anchoring." The Article concludes that the category of tort liability to
which students are first exposed affects the "frame" or "lens" through which
they view the judicial process. This frame becomes anchored and persists
throughout the study of other tort categories. The lessons about the nature of
the judging process learned implicitly through the professor's choice of
topic sequence may be even more important than the substantive topics
themselves.
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INTRODUCTION
Neither constitutions nor statutes explain the appropriate role of the
common law judge, a fundamental issue at the heart of lawmaking about
which legal scholars and politicians alike vociferously disagree. What then
should law students be taught about how judges decide cases? Legal
formalists once argued that law students should learn the "science of the
*. Edward M. Robertson Research Professor of Law, University of Maryland Carey
School of Law; J.D., Harvard University, 1976. The authors want to thank the following
professors who administered the student survey described in this Article and especially the more
than 450 first-semester law students enrolled in their Torts courses during the Fall semester
2011 who participated in the survey: Harry Surden of Colorado; David A. Super and Joshua C.
Teitelbaum of Georgetown; Robert Rhee of Maryland, as well as my own students; Mark
Geistfeld and Catherine M. Sharkey of New York University; Douglas E. Ray of St. Thomas
University; Susan R. Martyn, Geoffrey C. Rapp, and Joseph E. Slater of Toledo; Michael D.
Green and Ralph Peeples of Wake Forest; and Steven M. Barkan and Peter Carstensen of
Wisconsin. We greatly appreciated the helpful comments and suggestions from Taunya Banks,
Richard Boldt, Bob Condlin, Oscar Gray, Alan Hornstein, Geoffrey Rapp, Doug Ray, Bill
Reynolds, Bill Richman, and David Super, all of whom reviewed an earlier version of this
manuscript, as well as those from the participants at a faculty workshop at the University of
Maryland Carey School of Law. We also thank Greg Smith and Mike Jewell of the Information
Technology Office at the law school, for the key roles they played in collecting survey data, and
Maxine Grosshans of the Marshall Law Library. Finally, I personally want to thank Kathryn
Daughtry, Lauren Gold, Jhanelle Graham, and Ber-An Pan for their research and editorial
assistance.
**. M.A., University of Maryland College Park, 1997; J.D./M.B.A. candidate, University
of Maryland Carey School of Law and Johns Hopkins University Carey Business School
(expected 2014).
***. Professor of Sociology, Villanova University; Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania,
1979.
****.Ryan H. Easley Statistics and Legal Research Fellow, University of Maryland Carey
School of Law; J.D., University of Maryland Carey School of Law, 2011; M.S., University of
North Texas, 2005.
45:0097] 99
100 ARIZONA STATE LAWJOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J.
law,"' consisting of the logical application of rules and doctrines to the facts
of the case.2 By the 1930s, legal realists countered that students instead
should study the "pragmatic and socio-psychological"' motivations for
judicial decisions and consider the impacts of these decisions on society.'
Today, even though Kathryn Abrams proclaims that "we are all legal
realists (or post-realists) now,"' the debate continues.' Most obviously,
outside the walls of the academe, business interests decry policy-oriented
"judicial activism"' among judges rendering common law tort decisions and
insist that they follow rules and doctrines derived from precedents.
Flying under the radar of the tort debates, the most important battle in the
ongoing conflict over the proper role of the common law judge takes place
in the classrooms of first-semester law students. Most students enter law
1. WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN
LEGAL EDUCATION 32 (1994) (characterizing formalism).
2. See, e.g., Everett V. Abbot, Keener on Quasi-Contracts, II, 10 HARV. L. REV. 479, 481
(1897) (describing jurisprudence as a science with "syllogism in matters juridical" as its "first
postulate"); John M. Zane, German Legal Philosophy, 16 MICH. L. REV. 287, 338 (1918)
("Every judicial act resulting in a judgment consists of a pure deduction.").
3. Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431,
447 n.12 (1930).
4. E.g., HARRY SHULMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS xv (3d
ed. 1976) (explaining, in the preface, "we have tried to present the material in such a fashion as
to emphasize social consequences"); see also Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.
L. REV. 457,467 (1897) (arguing, as a precursor of legal realism, that "[j]udges themselves have
failed adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage"). See
generally Edward G. White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and
Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999, 1013-26 (1972)
(describing the shift from formalist thought to legal realism).
5. Kathryn Abrams, Some Realism About Electoralism: Rethinking Judicial Campaign
Finance, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 505, 512 (1999).
6. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare
Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155,
201 (2006) (advancing a "neo-formalist" conception of constitutional law that "views the force
of precedent as binding rather than as instrumental"); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Balanced Realism on
Judging, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1243, 1244-45 (2010) ("The entire legal culture has been
indoctrinated in the formalist-realist divide."); Ernest Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the
Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 951 (1988) (defending legal formalism and
arguing that law is distinguishable from politics).
7. See, e.g., Hans A. von Spakovsky & Jack Park, Judicial Nullification in Georgia:
Overriding Medical Malpractice Reform and Federal Law to Reward the Trial Bar, HERITAGE
FOUND. LEGAL MEMORANDUM, Jan. 2011, at 1 (asserting that "activist justices" on the Georgia
Supreme Court "substitute[d] their policy preferences" by ignoring precedent to strike down
caps on medical malpractice claims and allowing torts suits against vaccine makers); Editorial,
Supreme Court Rowe Would Bring Calm, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Apr. 28, 2004, at 4A (noting
that the United States Chamber of Commerce criticized past decisions of a judicial candidate as
examples of "judicial activism").
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school with little or no understanding of the common law process.! To the
extent that they have previously thought about the common law judge's
role, perhaps most see it as one of applying rules and doctrines to the facts
of a particular case. Those who have been exposed to the law in
undergraduate courses taught by government or political science professors,
in contrast, are presumably more likely to view the common law judge's
role as one involving decisions based on social, economic, and ideological
considerations. In either case, entering law students generally recognize that
they are for the first time encountering a new professional culture and body
of knowledge9 that will be important for the remainder of their professional
lives. Accordingly, they are quite impressionable.o It is here that
8. What knowledge and impressions of the law they do bring to the classroom is the
product of undergraduate courses covering the law, see, for example, Gerald P. Moran, Law
School and Its Usual Rendition: Some Thoughts for Incoming Law Students, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC.
370, 370 (1977-78) (stating that most entering law students come with "expectations, most of
which are largely based upon our undergraduate studies"); media coverage of fictional and non-
fictional depictions of the law, see, for example, Cassandra Sharp, The "Extreme Makeover"
Effect of Law School: Students Being Transformed by Stories, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 233,
233-35 (2005) (describing how law students' perceptions of the law are drawn substantially
from popular culture, literature, and media portrayals); or past work experiences in the legal
system or in employment that at least interacted with the legal system, see Ian Gallacher, "Who
Are Those Guys? ": The Results of a Survey Studying the Information Literacy of Incoming Law
Students, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 151, 155, 157-58 (2007) (noting that in a 2006 survey of 740
students from seven law schools, "[m]ore than 57% had at least one year of work experience
before coming to law school," and approximately 34% had worked "in a law firm or in a legal
department of some form").
9. MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 198 (H. H. Gerth & C.
Wright Mills eds., trans., 1998) (describing a vocation as requiring "a firmly prescribed course
of training"); see also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 364-65 (1962) (defining a craft as a recognizable line of work that involves a
teachable structure, specialized skills, and an evaluation procedure that ensures the presence of
such skills); Richard A. Posner, Professionalisms, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 2 (1998) (stating that a
profession "requires highly specialized, even esoteric, knowledge that can be acquired only by
specialized formal education or a carefully supervised apprenticeship").
10. See, e.g., Miriam E. Felsenburg & Laura P. Graham, Beginning Legal Writers in Their
Own Words: Why the First Weeks of Legal Writing Are So Tough and What We Can Do About
It, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 223, 256 (2010) (noting that "many beginning law students"
experience frustration in the early weeks of law school because "they were trying to learn the
law without an understanding of how the universe of the law operates"); Susan Sturm & Lani
Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal Education in a Culture of Competition and
Conformity, 60 VAND. L. REV. 515, 521 (2007) (arguing that the first year of law school is
"intentionally destabilizing: it invites students to suspend judgment, to question their intuitions,
to read structurally, to learn a new language, and to ask different questions"); see also SCOrT
TUROw, ONE L 9-10 (1977) (noting that the first year of law school "is also a time when law
students typically feel a stunning array of changes taking place within themselves . . . [and
when] many law students come to feel, sometimes with deep regret, that they are becoming
persons strangely different from the ones who arrived at law school in the fall").
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tomorrow's judges and lawyers are exposed, most often for the first time, to
the strange idea that in a democracy, common law judges deciding tort
cases, particularly appellate court judges, make law without any pretense of
substantive electoral accountability." These judges decide such important
issues as how the costs of the inevitably massive harms inflicted in the
modern industrial society 2 are to be shared between manufacturers and
consumers, doctors and patients, stores and customers, drivers involved in
auto accidents, and other injurers and victims. The judicial authority to
make these decisions flows from the idea that by following rules and
doctrines derived from precedents, a certain degree of fairness and
predictability is assured." At the same time, "the common law is not a
frozen pond, but a stream flowing through time." 1 4 At least to some extent,
most appellate judges consider social, economic, and political factors, as
well as their own sense of fairness, in deciding how to interpret precedents
and apply them to the facts of the case at hand."
11. Even state court judges, often elected, are not politically accountable in the same
manner as members of legislatures and governors. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.
4.1(12), 4.1(13) (2010) (providing that judges and judicial candidates should not make
statements that could be understood either "to affect the outcome or impair the fairness" of an
adjudication or "make pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the
impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office"); HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAW 664-65 (tent. ed. 1958) (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)
("[T]he popular election of judges does not in actual practice mean political accountability for
particular decisions, nor is it ordinarily so understood."); but see Thomas J. Miles & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 766-67 (2008)
(reporting empirical findings that federal judges appointed by a Democratic president were more
likely to cast liberal votes in an arbitrariness review of EPA and NLRB decisions than their
Republican counterparts).
12. See NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT
ACCIDENTS 3 (2000) (reporting that millions of Americans are accidentally injured each year,
nearly 100,000 fatally, and that the cost of accidental injuries exceeds $175 billion annually in
medical, employment, and other economic losses).
13. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 150 (1988) (stating
that the legitimacy of the judicial function within a common law system "depends in large part
on the employment of a process of reasoning that begins with existing legal and social standards
rather than with those standards the court thinks best"). Even Karl Llewellyn, a leading legal
realist, acknowledged that "it is prior decisions of judges that constitute the primary materials
for all law-related activity." KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 1 (Paul
Gewirtz ed., Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989).
14. HARRY SHULMAN, FLEMING JAMES, JR., OSCAR S. GRAY & DONALD G. GIFFORD, LAW
OF TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS iv (5th ed. 2010) [hereinafter SHULMAN & JAMES
CASEBOOK].
15. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 9, at 14 ("Judges should understand that the only sound
basis for a legal rule is its social advantage, which requires an economic judgment balancing
benefits against costs.").
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The balance between these two aspects of the judge's role, which are in
constant tension with one another, is perhaps the most important single
issue in the common law process. To what extent should judges be
committed to applying specific rules and doctrines from previous cases?
How much weight should judges give to the social and economic
consequences of their decisions or to their own sense of fairness? To a very
large extent, the nature of the appropriate decision-making process of
common law judges is determined by judges and lawyers themselves within
the craft and tradition of what they understand the common law process to
be.16 The initial framing of this process to which beginning law students are
exposed therefore plays an important role in defining not only individual
students' future professional roles," but also the common law torts process
itself.
This Article explores whether the sequence in which substantive areas of
law are presented to beginning law students affects their understanding of
the nature of the judicial role in torts cases. Sociologists and cognitive
psychologists believe that the sequence in which concepts are presented to
individuals-particularly concepts in tension with one another-profoundly
affects what these individuals remember and believe." If this occurs within
legal education, then professors who begin their introductory Torts classes
with intentional torts, for example, set their students out on a different path
than professors who begin with strict liability or negligence. The professor's
chosen starting point determines what Erving Goffman referred to as the
"frame" 9-and Judge Guido Calabresi calls the "lens" 2 0 -through which
the student is likely to view the judge's role in tort law.
16. See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 9, at 199 (alluding to the "'ideas of culture-values"' that
underlie a profession); Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Mr.
Rosenwald (May 13, 1927) quoted in Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992) ("In the last analysis,
the law is what the lawyers are. And the law and the lawyers are what the law schools make
them."); Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Why Lawyers are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 33, 53
(2001) ("[Law schools] are the entry point to the profession and help shape the system."); cf A
FEW GOOD MEN (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1992) (providing examples of military professionals
sharing knowledge and traditions that are not documented in writing through the testimony of a
Marine who is unable to point to sections in the Marine Corps manual describing either the
extra-legal disciplinary hazing known as "Code Red" or the location of the mess hall).
17. See Felsenburg & Graham, supra note 10, at 224 (noting that the first eight weeks is a
critical period in law students' education).
18. See infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
20. Telephone Interview with Guido Calabresi, Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, and Sterling Professor Emeritus of Law and Professorial Lecturer in Law,
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Most law students begin their study of torts with intentional torts. 21 At
least some professors believe that the subcategory of intentional torts is
somewhat more focused on well-established and specific rules and doctrines
than are the more open-ended and policy-driven categories of negligence
and strict liability. 22 Conversely, the judge's role in cases involving
negligence, and especially strict liability, are arguably less rule-driven and
more likely to be focused on social, economic, and ideological factors
and/or the judge's own sense of fairness. Real judges' common law
decision-making processes rarely, if ever, lie at one polar extreme or the
other, and most law students realize this. Nevertheless, the student is likely
to view the judicial role through somewhat different frames depending upon
where her study of tort law begins.
By the end of a single-semester introductory Torts class, presumably all
students have been exposed to intentional and negligent torts and many to
strict liability torts as well. The next question, therefore, is whether it all
comes out in the wash or whether sequence matters. Will the individual
frames through which torts students initially view the common law judicial
role continue to influence the student's understanding of the judicial role
throughout the course? Cognitive psychologists describe "anchoring bias,"
the notion that an individual's initial exposure to a concept or message can
have a significant effect on how the individual interprets subsequent related
experiences or messages.23 In other words, a student's conception of the
judicial role adopted during the study of one category of tort liability during
the first weeks of the semester is likely to persist throughout the semester. If
the framing and anchoring theories pioneered by sociologists and cognitive
psychologists apply to the topic sequence in the introductory course as we
suggest here, then casebook editors are teaching students one of the most
important lessons of the first year of law school-the appropriate function
of the common law judge-by their chosen sequence of topics.
To test these hypotheses, we surveyed beginning law students enrolled in
Torts courses taught by fifteen professors at eight law schools, four private
and four public, which varied significantly in terms of their academic
Yale Law Sch. (July 9, 2012). Those who have attended Judge Calabresi's lectures and classes
are familiar with his frequent use of this term in similar contexts.
21. See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text. The vast majority of torts casebooks
begin with intentional torts. Based on anecdotal evidence, we believe that an increasing number
of professors, squeezed for time in a three or four credit course, are deleting intentional torts or
at least starting the semester elsewhere. However, it is a safe assumption that a substantial
majority of students begin with intentional torts.
22. See infra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 111-33 and accompanying text.
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ranking.2 4 Students were prompted to respond to six substantive statements
to reveal their understanding of the judge's role in torts cases." With the
cooperation of their torts professors, we surveyed the students during the
first, seventh, and last week of the semester. As the course of their first
semester of law school progressed, all groups, regardless of where their
study of torts began, shifted away from the view that a judge's role is one of
applying rules and doctrines to the facts of a case and toward an
understanding of the judicial role that recognized the importance of policy.2 6
However, this shift was greatest, in a statistically significant way, among
students who began their study with strict liability torts. 27 To our surprise,
the shift among students who began with negligent torts was even less
pronounced, although still statistically significant, than the shift among
students who began with intentional torts. All these results held true even
when we held constant for the rank of the students' law school.2 8
The conclusion here is a simple one: Sequence in teaching the law
matters. The most important lessons learned by law students may be those
that law professors teach unwittingly. Accordingly, professors should pay
more attention to the subliminal messages that aspects of teaching, such as
topic sequence, communicate to those first entering the legal profession. In
the 1930s, realist law professors, such as Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank,
brought attention to the unintentional psychological impact of many factors
in the litigation process. 29 The results of this study suggest that the
successors to Llewellyn and Frank would be wise to heed these lessons as
they pursue their own craft.
Part I30 of this Article describes the sequence in which the three main
categories of tort liability-intentional torts, negligence, and strict
liability-are presented in torts casebooks3' and the explanations typically
24. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 141-42.
26. See infra Part JI.C.
27. See infra Part III.C. 1.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 147-49.
29. Jerome N. Frank observed that "distinctly personal biases are operating constantly"
within a judge. JEROME N. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 106 (1949). As an example,
when the judge "listen[s] to a witness with . . . a twang or cough or gesture," he may be
reminded of another individual with a similar characteristic in the past, and this "may affect the
judge's initial hearing of, or subsequent recollection of, what the witness said, or the weight or
credibility which the judge will attach to the witness' testimony." Id.; see also Karl N.
Llewellyn et al., The Case Law System in America, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 989, 995 (1988)
(suggesting that the judge is influenced by both "the thought patterns and mental images
absorbed from his surrounding," as well as his own priorities and prior experiences).
30. See infra notes 39-85 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
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offered by editors to justify the chosen sequences.32 Part II describes how
the concepts of frame analysis, or framing,33 and anchoring,3 4 both
originally developed by sociologists and cognitive psychologists, might
apply to the learning process of first-semester law students. In Part III," we
describe the methodology of the student survey 6 and present and discuss
the results." We then briefly conclude.
I. TopIc SEQUENCE IN THE TEACHING OF TORTS
The White Rabbit put on his spectacles. " Where shall I begin, please your
Majesty? " he asked. "Begin at the beginning, " the King said gravely ...
Alice's Adventures in Wonderland."9
John Goldberg, Anthony Sebok, and Benjamin Zipursky, leading torts
scholars who edit their own casebook, "recognize that there is a
fundamental choice to be made about where to start a course in Torts," 40 but
they argue that the importance of this disagreement among editors of
various books is "overblown." 41 This Article investigates whether this
opinion is correct.
Most torts casebooks begin with intentional torts,42 often after a brief
introductory chapter covering any one of a number of topics including the
32. See infra notes 67-73, 79-81, 83-85 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 111-33 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 138-50 and accompanying text.
36. See infra Parts III.A, III.B.
37. See infra Part III.C.
38. See infra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
39. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 94 (Sterling 2009).
40. JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TEACHER'S
MANUAL, TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS ix (3d ed. 2012) [hereinafter GOLDBERG,
SEBOK & ZIPURSKY, TEACHER'S MANUAL] (quotation used with permission of authors); see also
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, TEACHER'S MANUAL, PROSSER,
WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS v (12th ed. 2010) [hereinafter PROSSER
TEACHER'S MANUAL] ("The beginning point of a Torts course is contested.").
41. GOLDBERG, SEBOK & ZIPURSKY, TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 40.
42. E.g., ARTHUR BEST & DAVID W. BARNES, BASIC TORT LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND
PROBLEMS (3d ed. 2010); DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN BUBLICK, TORTS AND
COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY (6th ed.
2009); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
(10th ed. 2012) [hereinafter EPSTEIN TORTS CASEBOOK]; WARD FARNSWORTH & MARK F.
GRADY, TORTS: CASES AND QUESTIONS (2d ed. 2009); THOMAS C. GALLIGAN JR. ET AL., TORT
LAW: CASES, PERSPECTIVES, AND PROBLEMS (rev. 4th ed. 2007); JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR.,
106
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historical development of tort law,43 the structure of a lawsuit," or even a
brief contrast among intentional, negligent, and strict liability torts.4 5 The
casebook widely believed to dominate the market, Prosser, Wade and
Schwartz's Torts: Cases and Materials,4 6 as well as the casebook believed
to rank second in sales, Richard A. Epstein's and Catherine M. Sharkey's
Cases and Materials on Torts,47 both start with consideration of intentional
torts.48 A very small number of torts casebooks, notably Marc Franklin,
Robert Rabin, and Michael Green's Tort Law and Alternatives: Cases and
Materials,49 begin with negligence. Finally, Harry Shulman, Fleming James
Jr., Oscar S. Gray, and Donald G. Gifford's Cases and Materials on the
Law of Torts" is the only torts casebook we have been able to identify that
RICHARD N. PEARSON, DOUGLAS A. KYSAR & JOHN A. SILICIANO, THE TORTS PROCESS (8th ed.
2012) [hereinafter HENDERSON & PEARSON]; ROBERT E. KEETON, LEWIS D. SARGENTICH &
GREGORY C. KEATING, TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2005);
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE &
SCHWARTZ'S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (12th ed. 2010) [hereinafter PROSSER TORTS
CASEBOOK]; MARSHALL S. SHAPO & RICHARD J. PELTZ, TORT AND INJURY LAW (3d ed. 2006);
FRANK J. VANDALL, ELLEN WERTHEIMER & MARK C. RAHDERT, TORTS: CASES AND PROBLEMS
(3d ed. 2011). Some casebook editors explicitly note the ability of the instructor to adopt an
alternative sequence and begin with negligent torts. E.g., GOLDBERG, SEBOK & ZIPURSKY,
TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 40, at 4-31; PROSSER TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 40.
43. E.g., FARNSWORTH & GRADY, supra note 42, at xxxix-xli; PROSSER TORTS CASEBOOK,
supra note 42, at 2-16; DOMINICK VETRI, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE, JOAN E. VOGEL & IBRAHIM J.
GASSAMA, TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 10-11 (4th ed. 2011).
44. E.g., FARNSWORTH & GRADY, supra note 42, at xli; HENDERSON & PEARSON, supra
note 42, at 4-8; VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 4 (4th
ed. 2009) (explicitly addressing the role of the common law judge in the initial overview);
DAVID W. ROBERTSON, WILLIAM POWERS, JR., DAVID A. ANDERSON & OLIN GUY WELLBORN
III, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1-7 (4th ed. 2011).
45. E.g., FARNSWORTH & GRADY, supra note 42, at xxxviii-xxxix; KEETON, SARGENTICH
& KEATING, supra note 42, Chapter 1 (also listing vicarious liability and no-fault plans as
additional "forms of liability").
46. See supra note 42.
47. See supra note 42. Casebook publishers regard information about sales and market
shares as "proprietary" and decline to release it, but few familiar with this field would dispute
that these two casebooks rank first and second in sales.
48. EPSTEIN TORTS CASEBOOK, supra note 42, at 3-75 (beginning with a chapter on
"Intentional Harms: The Prima Facie Case and Defenses"); PROSSER TORTS CASEBOOK, supra
note 42, at 1-132 (presenting "Intentional Interference with Person or Property" as the first
chapter on substantive tort law after a brief introductory chapter).
49. MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN & MICHAEL D. GREEN, TORT LAW AND
ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS (9th ed. 2011); see also JOSEPH W. LITTLE, LYRISSA B.
LIDSKY & ROBERT H. LANDE, TORTS: THE CIVIL LAW OF REPARATION FOR HARM DONE BY
WRONGFUL ACT (3d ed. 2009).
50. SHULMAN & JAMES CASEBOOK, supra note 14.
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begins with strict liability torts." One of the coauthors of this Article, Don
Gifford, is, along with Oscar S. Gray, one of the two current editors of that
casebook.
A. The First Punch: Beginning With Intentional Torts
The decision made by the vast majority of torts professors to begin with
intentional torts seems a curious one. One of the current editors of the
Prosser casebook acknowledges "that negligence is the heart of modem tort
law."S2 Basic intentional torts seem less important. Richard Epstein, whose
coedited casebook also begins with intentional torts, admits,
[Flew tort actions are brought today for gang beatings on a public
street, no matter how compelling the case for tort liability. The
expansion of tort liability for personal injury and property
damages has been primarily for losses accidental from the point of
view of the defendant. As a matter of practice the hoary law of
intentional torts looks like a backwater in an otherwise booming
sea of common law liability.s"
Real world tort law today is all about "designing a satisfying system for
dealing with unintentional harms-auto accidents, professional malpractice,
product injuries, toxic exposures, and the like."54 As of 2005, intentional
torts represented less than three percent of all tort trials in state courts and a
similarly small percentage in federal courts.
51. Chapter 2 of the casebook considers "Traditional Forms of Strict Liability." SHULMAN
& JAMES CASEBOOK, supra note 14, at 49-130. It is preceded by an introductory chapter that
presents Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911) (holding a workers' compensation
act creating liability without fault to be unconstitutional) and the history of the common law of
torts. Id. at 1-48.
52. PROSSER TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 40, at v (reporting an observation by current
coeditor David F. Partlett).
53. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 1-2 (1999) [hereinafter EPSTEIN TORTS TREATISE].
54. MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN & MICHAEL D. GREEN, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO
TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (9th ed. 2011) [hereinafter FRANKLIN,
RABIN & GREEN, TEACHER'S MANUAL]; see also HARRY SHULMAN, FLEMING JAMES, JR., OSCAR
S. GRAY & DONALD G. GIFFORD, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO LAW OF TORTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS vi (5th ed. 2010) [hereinafter SHULMAN & JAMES, TEACHER'S MANUAL] ("The
central focus in modern tort law is determining when the costs of accidents should be shifted
from one party to another.") (emphasis in original).
55. LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 223851, CIVIL
BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 2 (2008), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf; THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, NCJ 208713, FEDERAL TORT TRIALS AND VERDICTS, 2002-03 (2005), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fttv03.pdf.
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Notwithstanding other explanations proffered by editors," the principal
reasons that torts casebooks begin with intentional torts appear to be history
and tradition. When James Barr Ames of Harvard published the first torts
casebook in 1874, it began with the intentional torts of assault and battery. 8
In fact, the vast majority of the entire 804-page book covers topics usually
categorized as intentional torts,59 despite the emergence of negligence as the
dominant standard in American tort law covering accidental injuries during
the preceding sixty years.6 0 On one hand, it is possible that Ames' sequence
simply reflected the historical reality that the roots of assault and battery lay
in the English writ of trespass, which gained prominence in courts of law in
the thirteenth century," well before the birth of the writ of trespass on the
case,62 from which, it was traditionally assumed, negligence evolved. On
56. See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., EPSTEIN TORTS TREATISE, supra note 53, at 2 (justifying beginning the
treatise with intentional torts because "much of the early historical development of the common
law, both in England and in the United States, was intertwined with intentional torts"); PROSSER
TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 40, at v (stating that "an understanding of historical grounding
provides a sure grounding" for the study of torts).
58. JAMES BARR AMES, SELECT CASES ON TORTS 1-39 (1874), available at
http://gdc.gale.com/products/the-making-of-modern-law-primary-sources- 1620-1926/ (follow
"Making of Modem Law: Legal Treatises, 1800-1926" hyperlink; then search for "select cases
on torts" and year of publication for "1874"; then follow "eTable of Contents" hyperlink).
59. Id. (covering such topics as assault, battery, and imprisonment).
60. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 97-
99 (1977).
61. See WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDsWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 331-32 (7th ed.
1956); FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 511-43 (2d ed. 1952); see also Elizabeth Jean Dix, The Origins
of the Action of Trespass on the Case, 46 YALE L.J. 1142, 1142-43, 1145 (1937) (supporting the
Holdsworth account against a competing theory that trespass on the case originated
independently from the 1285 Statute of Westminster II).
62. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 61, at 331-32; see also R.F.V. HEUSTON, R.A. BUCKLEY &
JOHN WILLIAM SALMOND, SALMOND AND HEUSTON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 5-6 (19th ed. 1987);
Dix, supra note 61, at 1156.
63. Until the mid-1970s, the generally accepted view was that trespass was a strict liability
tort and that trespass on the case (also called "case" or "on the case") required a showing of
fault. Under this view, Brown v. Kendall effectively eliminated the difference between trespass
and case in Massachusetts-stating that, to prevail in trespass, a plaintiff must prove "want of
due care." 60 Mass. (1 Cush.) 292, 297 (1850). However, it does not necessarily follow that
"want of due care" had previously been a traditional requirement in an action on the case.
Instead, it has been contended by Morton Horwitz that, at least in American courts before the
early nineteenth century, the opinions in accident cases did not require proof of negligence in
actions either on the case or in trespass. HORWITZ, supra note 60, at 89-94. Thereafter, he
argues, actions for trespass and case were transformed within a few short decades, about the
time of Brown v. Kendall, to require proof of want of care, in a "flowering of the negligence
action having nothing to do with any earlier recognition of a substantive distinction between
writs." Id. at 91.
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the other hand, Ames and his dean at the Harvard Law School, Christopher
Columbus Langdell, were on a mission to promote an understanding of the
law that focused on the common law process as a rule-to-application
"scientific" method in order to justify professional education for lawyers
within the university context.64 The more rule-like nature of intentional torts
better fit their purposes than did the somewhat messier and policy-driven
initial negligence opinions from the preceding decades.6 ' Today's torts
professors who follow the traditional sequence might plausibly be
considered unwitting conscripts, nearly a century and a half later, in
Langdell's mission to change society's understanding of how the law works
and what legal education should be.66
Editors who begin with intentional torts offer several other reasons why
they believe intentional torts to be the logical starting point for the study of
torts. For example, Epstein describes it as "a relatively well defined and
manageable subset of torts."6 7 Other editors find intentional torts to be "a
nice warm-up for the materials on negligence," 68 "relatively accessible to
the student just starting her or his law school career,"6 9 and characterized by
"memorable" cases.70 Most important, the comparative simplicity of the
often rule-based analysis in intentional torts provides an arguably better
vehicle for exploring both the utility and the limitations of rules in common
law development. Dan Dobbs and Paul Hayden describe their goals in
64. See, e.g., C. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS Vi
(Lawbook Exch. 2d prtg. 2002) (1871) ("Law, considered as a science, consists of certain
principles or doctrines."); Christopher C. Langdell, Address at the Meeting of the Harvard Law
School Association on the 250th Anniversary of the Founding of Harvard University (Nov. 5,
1886), in 3 L.Q. REV. 118, 124 (1887) (stating that "all the available materials of that science are
contained in printed books"); see also W. Burlette Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32 GA. L.
REV. 1, 136 (concluding that Langdell "used the term 'science' because 'science' was the
prevailing test of a discipline's validity within the university").
65. Morton Horwitz bluntly concludes that "the law of negligence became a leading
means by which the dynamic and growing forces in American society were able to challenge
and eventually overwhelm the weak and relatively powerless segments of the American
economy." HORWITZ, supra note 60, at 99.
66. We are indebted to Professor David A. Super of the Georgetown University Law
Center for suggesting how Ames' objectives were better served by his focus on intentional torts.
67. EPSTEIN TORTS TREATISE, supra note 53, at 2. Epstein identifies several other reasons
for beginning with intentional torts. In addition to the others described in the text, he also notes
that "understanding intentional harms helps make sense out of some modem areas of tort
liability, such as the important question of whether and when a defendant landlord should be
held responsible for the rape or murder of a plaintiff tenant by a criminal intruder." Id.
68. WARD FARNSWORTH & MARK GRADY, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO TORTS: CASES AND
QUESTIONS ix (2d ed. 2009).
69. FRANK J. VANDALL, ELLEN WERTHEIMER & MARK C. RAHDERT, TEACHER'S MANUAL
To BASIC TORT LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND PROBLEMS 3 (2d ed. 2007).
70. Id.
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teaching intentional torts to include the concept that "[r]ules do not
necessarily determine or predict cases, but they do tell lawyers something
about the kinds of arguments that must be made and the kinds of evidence
to obtain." 7 At the same time, editors view intentional torts as a fertile
ground for showing students that rules are not self-defining but require
examination of the purposes 72 and policies 73 underlying the rules.
It is likely that students who begin their study of torts with intentional
torts spend more time on this subject than do students who begin with
negligent or strict liability torts. Even reasonably prudent torts professors
occasionally fall behind the schedules prescribed in their syllabi. In the first
weeks of the semester, a considerable amount of their time and attention is
focused on teaching a new vocabulary, discussing how to read a case, and
describing basic principles of the common law. Teachers of first-year
courses recognize that the pace of student learning is considerably slower
and more deliberate in the earliest weeks of the semester than it is later.74
In addition, many professors who begin with intentional torts almost
certainly use cases involving affirmative defenses to intentional torts to
bootleg into their teaching what is arguably the most important single issue
in all tort law-the basic choice between a fault-based and a strict liability
standard. For example, a professor might introduce this basic issue through
discussions of self-defense cases in which the defendant reasonably, but
mistakenly, believed that his life was in danger.7 ' Allowing the defendant to
71. DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY TORTS AND
COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 38 (6th
ed. 2009). Dobbs and Hayden also identify the following goals for teaching intentional torts:
"developing skills and elementary knowledge necessary to move forward" and beginning the
teaching of legal analysis, including "the construction of arguments or opinions using two or
more rules." Id.
72. For example, Dobbs and Hayden advise instructors using their casebook that although
"[r]ules may be thought of narrowly in terms of technical doctrine . . . applying them in
particular cases may be easier if we try to see the underlying purpose or principle . . Id. at
38.
73. Epstein argues that "[i]ntentional wrongs present difficult conceptual and policy
questions." EPSTEIN TORTS TREATISE, supra note 53, at 2.
74. For example, Robert L. Rabin reports, "Like generations of earlier torts professors, I
begin the introductory course with discussion of assigned cases from a casebook, moving
slowly at first, exploring the facts, issues, procedural framework, and rationale for decision.
During the semester, the pace will quicken and the issues will vary." ROBERT L. RABIN,
PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW xi (4th ed. 1995).
75. See, e.g., Courvoisier v. Raymond, 47 P. 284, 287 (Colo. 1896) (holding that a
defendant facing circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to believe he was in danger
of loss of life or of grave bodily harm may use deadly force even if the victim in fact posed no
threat). One of the authors of this article, Don Gifford, used this opinion to introduce his
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avoid liability for battery and wrongful death under these circumstances
mirrors a fault-based standard,76 while holding the defendant liable in this
context reflects a strict liability-based standard. Similarly, in teaching the
well-known trespass/necessity case of Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation
Co.,7' a professor might discuss how requiring the defendant to compensate
the plaintiff for damage, even when the defendant acted out of necessity,
addresses the distinction between strict liability and negligence standards.
Again, the case offers an opportunity to introduce students to these broader
questions, all under the guise of teaching intentional torts. 7 8 What is not
clear is why professors beginning with intentional torts prefer to introduce
the choice between fault-based and strict liability standards indirectly while
teaching intentional torts rather than beginning the course with the study of
either negligence or strict liability where the issue would be raised in a more
transparent and meaningful manner.
B. Why Begin with Negligence? "The Central Themes in Tort Law
Today"79
As previously mentioned, a very small number of torts casebooks begin
with negligent torts.0 Marc Franklin, Robert Rabin, and Michael Green
explain that beginning with anything other than the unintentional harms that
lie at the heart of contemporary tort practice would "give[] a misleading
signal about the central themes in tort law today" and that "the introductory
issues in analyzing negligence versus strict liability . . . pose no special
students to the distinction between negligence and strict liability standards during the decade in
which he began his Torts course with intentional torts.
76. Id.
77. 124 N.W. 221, 222 (Minn. 1910) (holding that even though defendant ship owner who
re-tied his ship to the plaintiffs dock during a storm acted under necessity and thus was not
liable for trespass, defendant still was required to compensate plaintiff for the resulting damage
to his dock). See also SHULMAN & JAMES, TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 54, at 236
(comparing the "reasonable person standard" used by court to the "similar one used in
negligence law").
78. See TEACHER'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY ROBERT A. KEETON, LEWIS D. SARGENTICH
& GREGORY C. KEATING, TORT AND ACCIDENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS i (4th ed. 2005);
SHULMAN & JAMES, TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 54, at 28 (describing the holding in
Vincent as resting on "strict liability basis"); EPSTEIN TORTS TREATISE, supra note 53, at 64
(discussing the court's reliance on a doctrine of "incomplete privilege" as a partial defense to
the trespass claim, rather than on negligence law).
79. FRANKLIN, RABIN & GREEN, TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 54, at 2.
80. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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difficulties for beginning law students and hold more intrinsic interest for
the law students of today than do intentional torts.""
C. Beginning with Strict Liability Torts: "An Extraordinarily Clever
Organ ofPropaganda "?82
The choice of the coeditors of Shulman, James, Gray and Gifford's
Cases and Materials on the Law of Torts8 3 to begin with strict liability torts
at first blush seems a more curious choice. That decision was made decades
before one of us (Gifford) joined the casebook as an editor. Coeditor Oscar
Gray explained that the sequence reflected the historical reality that liability
based on trespass, a strict liability tort, preceded the historical development
of negligence.8 4
The "strict liability-first" sequence is integral to the structure of this
casebook and aims to disabuse students of the commonly-held notion that
fault-based liability is the historical norm. After teaching from the casebook
for several years, following more than a decade of teaching from the
intentional torts-first Epstein casebook, coeditor Gifford observed:
The teaching of battery and assault most often is accomplished by
inductively working toward rules or definitions that will predict
how courts will respond to various fact-patterns resulting in claims
under these torts. This process inevitably strengthens the beliefs of
most entering law students that "the law" is a list of doctrines and
rules and that what lawyers and judges do is to try to pigeonhole
fact-patterns within the proper rules. In doing so, we believe, early
teaching of intentional torts obscures the reality of the torts
process that is simultaneously both more fact-based and more
policy-oriented.
81. FRANKLIN, RABIN & GREEN, TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 54 at 2.
82. George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 499-500 (1985)
(criticizing the second edition of the Shulman and James casebook as "an extraordinarily clever
organ of propaganda ... designed to show . .. that . .. the fault concept is indefensible in the
modern world").
83. SHULMAN & JAMES CASEBOOK, supra note 14.
84. Interview by Don Gifford with Oscar S. Gray, Jacob A. France Professor Emeritus of
Torts, Univ. of Md. Carey Sch. of Law, in Balt., Md. (July 11, 2012).
85. SHULMAN & JAMES, TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 54, at 231. Similarly, Judge
Guido Calabresi, who has used the Shulman & James casebook and its predecessor editions in
teaching Torts at Yale for many decades, observes that it enables him to introduce his students
to different law and perspectives on the law, particularly the economic consequences of rules.
Telephone interview with Guido Calabresi, supra note 20.
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The study described in this Article tests that intuition.
II. FRAME ANALYSIS AND ANCHORING
In this Article, we contend that when the torts professor selects
intentional torts, negligence, or strict liability as the beginning point in the
Torts course, she chooses, at the same time, to initially expose her students
to one of two or more varying conceptions of the role of the common law
judge in deciding tort cases. The judge's role in deciding intentional torts
cases, at least on the surface, appears to focus more on applying the
definitions and rules governing battery" or assault than does the judge's
role in deciding whether the defendant's conduct meets the amorphous test
of "unreasonableness" so as to constitute negligence" or whether the
defendant will be held liable on a strict liability basis under the even more
policy-laden tests for strict liability torts such as abnormally dangerous
activities" or nuisance.8
Admittedly, professors beginning with intentional torts typically do use
such cases to explore the limits of rules and definitions and the importance
of policy in determining these limits.90 Notwithstanding this possibility,
however, we hypothesized that by the end of their Torts courses, students
whose study of torts began with intentional torts are more likely than
students who began their study with either negligence or strict liability torts
to perceive the judge's role as one of applying a set of legal rules and
definitions to the facts of the case at hand and less likely to attribute
significance to the role of social, economic, and ideological objectives in
the judicial process than would students whose study of torts began with
either negligent or strict liability torts.
86. See, e.g., FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, JAMES
AND GRAY ON TORTS § 3.3 (3d ed. 2006) (outlining "elements" of battery).
87. John L. Diamond, Rethinking Media Liability for Defamation of Public Figures, 5
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 289, 312 (1996) (acknowledging that "negligence-what is
unreasonable under the circumstances-is a vague concept"); Kenneth W. Simons, Dimensions
of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 283, 330 (2002)
(describing negligence as conveyed in "vague 'unreasonableness"' terms).
88. Frank J. Vandall, Applying Strict Liability to Professionals: Economic and Legal
Analysis, 59 IND. L.J. 25, 43 (1983) (concluding that "[s]trict liability in abnormally dangerous
activities is primarily a question of social policy").
89. Alan E. Brownstein, Constitutional Wish Granting and the Property Rights Genie, 13
CONST. COMMENT. 7, 49 (1996) (observing that "few common law areas are as explicitly
grounded on policy based balancing as is nuisance law").
90. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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Before we describe the study itself,9 1 this Part reviews the relevant social
science literature that describes frame analysis 92 and anchoring93 and then
applies these concepts to the issue of whether topic sequence within the
Torts course affects how law students perceive the judge's role in
adjudication.
A. Frame Analysis
In 1974, sociologist Erving Goffman introduced the concept of frame
analysis or framing theory. 9 4 As Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman
explained more than three decades later:
The major premise of framing theory is that an issue can be
viewed from a variety of perspectives and be construed as having
implications for multiple values or considerations. Framing refers
to the process by which people develop a particular
conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an
issue. 95
In applying this process, Goffman theorized, an individual "render[s] what
would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is
meaningful." 96 As such, according to David A. Snow and Robert D.
Benford, frames "can be construed as functioning in a manner analogous to
91. See infra notes 138-50 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 94-110 and accompanying text.
93. See infra Part II.B.
94. ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF
EXPERIENCE 21 (Ne. Univ. Press 1986) (1974) ("When the individual . .. recognizes a particular
event, he tends, whatever else he does, to imply in this response (and in effect employ) one or
more frameworks or schemata of interpretation. . . ."). Goffman himself credits William James,
Alfred Schutz, and others with the insights underlying his exposition of frame analysis. Id. at 2-
8.
95. Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Framing Theory, 10 ANNU. REV. POLIT. SCI.
103, 104 (2007). Similarly, Donald A. Schon and Martin Rein explain frame analysis as
follows:
Each story conveys a very different view of reality and represents a
special way of seeing. From a problematic situation that is vague,
ambiguous, and indeterminate (or rich and complex, depending on one's
frame of mind), each story selects and names different features and relations
that become the "things" of the story-what the story is about.... Each story
places the features it has selected within the frame of a particular
context ....
DONALD A. SCHON & MARTIN REIN, FRAME REFLECTION: TOWARD THE RESOLUTION OF
INTRACTABLE POLICY CONTROVERSIES 26 (1994).
96. See GOFFMAN, supra note 94.
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linguistic codes in that they provide a grammar that punctuates and
syntactically connects patterns or happenings in the world."9 7
In the past, legal scholars typically applied frame analysis, or "framing,"
to parties' handling of quantifiable variables in contexts such as legal
negotiation,9 8 litigation,99 and the market pricing of securities.o Indeed,
Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie, among the leading scholars writing
about the phenomenon, define "the framing effect" as "reference point
bias.""0 ' In doing so, they reflect the earlier work of cognitive psychologists
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman.'02 Korobkin and Guthrie report that
when litigants choose between "an option with a known outcome and one
with an uncertain outcome . . . [they] often consider not only the expected
value of each choice, but also whether the possible outcomes appear to be
'gains' or 'losses' relative to a reference point, typically the status quo."103
In other words, the status quo "frames" the litigant's perception of each
quantified alternative.
97. David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Master Frames and Cycles of Protest, in
FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 133, 138 (Aldon D. Morris & Carol McClurg
Mueller eds., 1992).
98. E.g., Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation
Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 130 (1994) (defining "framing
effect" as "the idea that people are risk averse in the face of what they perceive as a potential
gain and risk seeking in the face of what they perceive as a potential loss"). But see Robert J.
Condlin, Legal Bargaining Theory's New "Prospecting" Agenda: It May Be Social Science, But
Is It News?, 10 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 215, 273-74 (2010) (warning of the limitations of the
applications of "prospect theory," framing, and anchoring to legal bargaining).
99. E.g., Chris Guthrie, Better Settle than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory ofLitigation
Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 43 (1999) (describing Regret Aversion Theory, which
predicts that "individuals will seek to make decisions that minimize the likelihood they will
experience postdecision regret"); Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological
Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 167-68 (2000) (describing the "Framing Theory of Litigation"
which provides that litigants "make risk-adverse decisions when choosing between gains and
risk-seeking decisions when choosing between losses"); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses,
and the Psychology ofLitigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 118-19 (1996) (applying Behavioral
Decision Theory to explain that litigants prefer sure but smaller gains over larger, but riskier
gains; but that they prefer riskier outcomes over sure losses).
100. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structure as an Independent Variable in Assessing Stock
Market Failures, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 547, 576 (2004) (identifying corporate law and
GAAP, among others, as frames in the pricing of corporate securities).
101. Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 98.
102. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 Scl. 1124, 1128 (1974) ("In many situations, people make estimates by starting from
an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer.").
103. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining Table, 87
MARQ. L. REV. 795, 802 (2004).
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Social scientists also apply framing and frame analysis to a broad array
of non-quantifiable contexts, including media and public relations,'0 4 film
and broadcasting,o' and the mobilization of social movements.'06 More
recently, legal scholars have begun to employ framing or frame analysis to
situations other than those involving quantifiable variables.0 7 For example,
Amy Kapczynski uses "frame mobilization" to analyze how various players
in intellectual property law "engage the field of ideas to theorize their
interests, build alliances, mobilize support, and discredit their opponents."'0
While other scholars identify the effects of law in framing social or
political movements, this Article is the first to consider the role of framing
in the process through which law students develop an understanding of the
judicial process. Here, as in any other educational setting, frame analysis is
closely allied with the concept of schema. According to cognitive
psychologists, a schema consists of the organized body of knowledge that
an individual retains about a specific concept, action, event, or other
segment of knowledge that influences her interpretations of new
situations.'09
104. E.g., Yun Jung Choi & Jong Hyuk Lee, The Role of a Scene in Framing a Story: An
Analysis of a Scene's Position, Length, and Proportion, 50 J. BROADCAST & ELECTRONIC
MEDIA 703, 720 (2006) (analyzing newspaper articles using frame analysis); Chong &
Druckman, supra note 95, at 109.
105. Kenneth Mulligan & Philip Habel, An Experimental Test of the Effects of Fictional
Framing on Attitudes, 92 SOC. SCI. Q. 79, 85 (2011) (studying effects of fictional framing on
attitudes toward abortion).
106. Nicholas Pedriana, From Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal Framing Processes
and Transformation of the Women's Movement in the 1960s, 111 AM. J. Soc. 1718, 1719 (2006)
(describing a "framing contest" between constructions of the women's movement as one of
"protective" versus "equal" treatment).
107. Judith D. Fischer, Got Issues? An Empirical Study about Framing Them, 6 J. ASS'N
LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 1, 2 (2009) (explaining importance of issue statement in briefs by
using framing theory); Judith D. Fischer, Framing Gender: Federal Appellate Judges' Choices
About Gender-Neutral Language, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 473, 485 (2009) ("Framing theory shows
that if judges use gender-biased language, they construct a frame through which both women
and men see men as the dominant norm."); Charlotte Ryan & Samuel Alexander, "Reframing"
the Presentation of Environmental Law and Policy, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 563, 567
(2006) (describing use of issue-framing in mobilization of support for environmental causes).
108. Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 809 (2008).
109. See JOHN P. HOUSTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF LEARNING AND MEMORY 410 (4th ed. 1991)
(identifying schema as "the organized body of information an individual has about some action,
concept, event, or other segment of knowledge"); JEANNE ELLIS ORMROD, HUMAN LEARNING
(5th ed. 2008) (defining schema as "a closely connected set of ideas ... related to a specific
object or event ... [that] often influence how we perceive and remember new situations"); W.
SCOTT TERRY, LEARNING AND MEMORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES, PROCESSES, AND PROCEDURES 288
(3d ed. 2006) (defining schemas as "outlines of general knowledge that are stored in semantic
memory").
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For our purposes, the relevant frame is the chosen frame through which
the professor presents the judicial role in the handling of torts cases during
her students' introductory study of the common law. Is the emphasis on the
application of rules and doctrines to the facts of the case? Or is the focus on
either the judge's own sense of fairness or her consideration of social,
economic, and/or ideological factors? Each of these alternatives reflects a
distinct and hypothetically polar opposite frame for interpreting the judicial
process. In the real world, of course, every law professor teaches a merged
version of these two frames. The more accurately stated issue is where the
frame of the judicial role presented by the professor lies along the
continuum beginning with rule or doctrine application at one end and
terminating with the consideration of social, economic, and ideological
considerations, as well as the judge's own sense of fairness, at the other
end." 0
B. Anchoring
Once an individual adopts a frame for interpreting events or concepts,
that frame is likely to be resilient and persist even when, looking objectively
at new information and situations, it should not. This idea is derived from
the concept of "anchoring," but also is referred to by a variety of other
labels including "status quo bias""' and "belief perseverance."ll2 According
to Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner, "'[a]nchoring' refers to the ability
of initial 'reference points' to influence judgments. Once initial reference
points, or 'anchors,' are established, adjustments to these initial anchors
tend to be too small. Anchoring thus biases final judgments in the direction
of the anchor.""' Later research suggests that the anchoring effect results
110. Embedded within these two competing frames describing the judicial process is
another set of frames. The issue is how does the judge frame the legal dispute? To what extent
does he or she apply rules and doctrines to the facts of the case? To what extent does he or she
consider social, economic, and political factors or his or her own sense of fairness? Initially, this
frame analysis is historical: What did the judge in the opinion reported in the casebook
ultimately do? More important, however, is the implicit predictive question in the student's
mind: What will the judge do in cases in which I represent one of the parties?
111. William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988) ("Individuals exhibited a significant status quo bias across a
range of decisions.").
112. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630, 646 (1999) ("There is ... strong support for the
common-sense view that first impressions carry disproportionate weight.").
113. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 362-63
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from the "enhanced accessibility of anchor-consistent information, not
insufficient adjustment." 14
As with framing and frame analysis, the existing literature predominantly
describes anchoring in the context of quantifiable variables,"' but the same
concept, regardless of the label used, has broader application. As Amos
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman write, "It is a psychological commonplace
that people strive to achieve a coherent interpretation of the events that
surround them . . . ."l 6 Other commentators have further noted, "It appears
that beliefs-from relatively narrow personal impressions to broader social
theories-are remarkably resilient in the face of empirical challenges that
seem logically devastating.""
Though the idea is generally not labeled as "anchoring," the literature of
education and learning theory routinely describes the same phenomenon. As
early as the 1890s, American psychologist and philosopher William James,
in his lectures to teachers on psychology, said, "In admitting a new body of
experience, we instinctively seek to disturb as little as possible our pre-
(1996) (discussing anchoring in the context of excessive standardization of provisions in
corporate contracts).
114. Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic: Why
the Adjustments Are Insufficient, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 311, 316 (2006) (reporting on study
designed to evaluate potential causes of the anchoring effect).
115. E.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Bias, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 14 (Daniel Kahneman,
Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982). Tversky and Kahneman describe anchoring as
follows:
In many situations, people make estimates by starting from an initial
value that is adjusted to yield the final answer. The initial value, or starting
point, may be suggested by the formulation of the problem, or it may be the
result of a partial computation. In either case, adjustments are typically
insufficient. That is, different starting points yield different estimates, which
are biased toward the initial values.
Id. at 14 (citation omitted); see also Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich,
Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 787 (2001) ("When people make numerical
estimates (e.g., the fair market value of a house), they commonly rely on the initial value
available to them (e.g., the list price).") (emphasis added).
116. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Causal Schemas in Judgments under
Uncertainty, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 115, at
117.
117. Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the
Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 115, at 144. Tversky and Kahneman report
observing anchoring in areas other than those involving quantifiable reference points, including
"the more general question of the relation between an image, model, or schema of a system,
[such as] the energy situation or the personality of an individual, and some outcome or
manifestation of that system, [such as] an increased use of solar energy or a display of
hostility." Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 116, at 125.
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existing stock of ideas. We always try to name a new experience in some
way which will assimilate it to what we already know.""8 A century later, a
leading educational textbook states that "learners are more likely to interpret
new information in ways that are consistent with what they already 'know'
about the world.""'9
Frame-anchoring can be viewed as one variant of the well-known
primacy effect. Lance Holbert and colleagues observe that "[t]here is solid
empirical evidence supporting the claim that when someone comes into
contact with two competing messages in immediate succession, the first
message consumed tends to be more persuasive."'2 0 Thus, the frame
presented initially "may establish a cognitive framework . . . that guides
interpretation of later items."' 2 ' Similarly, C.A. Insko writes that the first
message an individual encounters can alter his understanding of any
subsequent messages.122
To the law professor, the importance of topic sequencing in the law
school classroom may most readily resemble the more familiar phenomenon
of path dependence in common law or constitutional law development.123 In
118. WILLIAM JAMES, TALKS TO TEACHERS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND TO STUDENTS ON SOME OF
LIFE'S IDEALS 87 (Arc Manor 2008) (1983). James also stated:
The gist of the matter is this: Every impression that comes in from
without .. . no sooner enters our consciousness than it is drafted off in some
determinate direction or other, making connection with the other materials
already there, and finally producing what we call our reaction.... Educated
as we already are, we never get an experience that remains for us completely
nondescript.. . . [w]e dispose of it according to our acquired possibilities, be
they few or many, in the way of "ideas." .. . And it may well solemnize a
teacher, and confirm in him a healthy sense of the importance of his mission,
to feel how exclusively dependent upon his present ministrations in the way
of imparting conceptions the pupil's future life is probably bound to be.
Id. at 86, 91.
119. ORMROD, supra note 109, at 271.
120. R. Lance Holbert, Jennifer L. Lambe, Anthony D. Dudo & Kristin A. Carlton,
Primacy Effects of The Daily Show and National TV News Viewing: Young Viewers, Political
Gratifications, and Internal Political Self-Efficacy, 51 J. BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA
20,21 (2007).
121. Jon A. Krosnick & Duane F. Alwin, An Evaluation of a Cognitive Theory ofResponse-
Order Effects in Survey Measurement, 51 PUB. OPINION Q. 201, 202 (1987).
122. C.A. INSKO, THEORIES OF ATTITUDE CHANGE passim (1967) (presenting research
illustrating how interpretation of new information depends substantially on attitudes formed
from prior exposure to similar information).
123. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 604 (2001) (describing "how
history influences the pattern and process of legal change in a common law system"); Maxwell
L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV.
1309, 1315 (1995) (defining path dependency as the "phenomenon ... that the order in which
cases are presented for review affects . . . the substantive content of decisions"). Path
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any judicial process relying on precedent, the law is shaped not only by the
reasoning of judges but by the order in which cases come before them.124
Litigants on both sides of an important issue sometimes go to great lengths
to manipulate the sequence of cases presented to a court.125 Each side
involved in a continuing or repetitive dispute seeks to assure that cases
presenting facts favorable from its perspective are resolved first, so that
when the court decides subsequent cases posing the same basic issue, but
with less favorable facts, it will be bound, or at least influenced, by the
holding in the earlier cases.' 26
The law student's propensity to anchor or to continue to follow her first
frame of the judicial role is one example of what Oona Hathaway describes
as "increasing returns path dependence."' 2 7 Once the torts student adopts an
initial way of interpreting the judicial role, it is more difficult to change to a
new interpretation, even if such a change is warranted by changed facts in
later-considered opinions.128 Hathaway identifies the same pattern among
judges, who she asserts "accumulate experience and knowledge over time"
and "draw on earlier analogous cases in deciding later cases even if they do
dependence also has been observed in a variety of other fields, including technology, see
Stephen Redding, Path Dependence, Endogenous Innovation, and Growth, 43 INT'L EcON. REV.
1215, 1215 (2002); the operation of markets, see S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path
Dependence, Lock-in, and History, 11 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 205, 207 (1995); theories of poverty
and international development, see Mahmud Yesuf & Randall A. Bluffstone, Poverty, Risk
Aversion, and Path Dependence in Low-Income Countries: Experimental Evidence from
Ethiopia, 91 AM. J. AGRIC. EcoN. 1022, 1022-37 (2009); and physics, see J. W. Dougill, Path
Dependence and a General Theory for the Progressively Fracturing Solid, 390 PRoC. ROYAL
Soc'Y LONDON 341-51 (1983).
124. See Hathaway, supra note 123, at 604, 622-27 ("The system of stare decisis thereby
creates an explicitly path-dependent process in which later decisions rely on, and are
constrained by, earlier decisions.").
125. Oona Hathaway cites the well-known example of Justice Thurgood Marshall's
successful efforts, as a lawyer representing the NAACP, to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896). Hathaway, supra note 123, at 648. Marshall and his colleagues brought a
series of cases that each took small steps toward banning segregation, ultimately building up to
the groundbreaking decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Hathaway,
supra note 123, at 648.
126. See id. at 631 (analyzing the impact of binding and persuasive precedents).
127. Id. at 606-07.
128. The most commonly cited traditional example of increasing returns path dependence
was the adoption of the QWERTY typewriter keyboard. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics
of QWERTY, 75 AM. EcoN. REV. 332, 332 (1985). Despite the fact that other keyboard
arrangements would have been more efficient, the QWERTY keyboard became virtually
universal and survived even into the computer era because of the massive efforts that would
have been required to retrain typists.
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not strictly constitute a binding or persuasive precedent."' 29 This leads to
what she describes as "lock-in or inflexibility""' among judges.
It is not unrealistic to expect that something similar occurs with first-
semester students, anxiously grasping for certainty in a new and unfamiliar
world that requires them to interpret what it is that common law judges do.
Research in contexts other than legal education shows that the anchoring
effect is most pronounced in situations where an individual adopts her
initial frame for understanding concepts at a time when her ability to
accurately interpret them is particularly weak.13 ' This may be due in part to
the psychological commitment she has made to the initial frame: As with
the concept of sunk costs in economics, the more an individual invests in
forming an initial frame, the less inclined she is to abandon that frame for a
new one.'32 Alternatively (or additionally), this effect may stem from the
individual's need to perceive that she is in control-a perception reinforced
by retaining the status quo. 133
When a student first arrives at law school, she brings with her some
conception, or frame, of the judge's role in the common law process.
However, in all probability, she is initially very open to accepting a new
frame explaining the judge's role.134 After all, she entered law school to
learn about such things! In the Torts classroom, she begins by spending
several weeks on one of three categories of torts cases: intentional torts,
negligent torts, or strict liability torts. For most law students, probably more
than three quarters, the class begins with intentional torts. Regardless of the
starting area of tort liability, the frame for understanding the judicial role
that the student initially adopts will fall somewhere along the line between
explaining the judge's role as solely one of applying rules and doctrines to
129. Hathaway, supra note 123, at 628.
130. Id. at 631.
131. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 112, at 646-47 (finding that test subjects initially shown
a blurry photo were less able to identify a subsequent sharper image than were subjects who
first viewed a less-blurry photo and concluding that "if individuals construct their initial
hypothesis at a time when their basis for, or ability to, make such a judgment is particularly
weak, they may be unable to interpret correctly subsequent better information that is
inconsistent with that hypothesis").
132. See Epley & Gilovich, supra note 114114, at 316 ("We also obtained evidence that
adjustment is effortful, and so anything that increases a person's willingness or ability to seek
more accurate estimates tends to reduce the magnitude of adjustment-based anchoring biases.").
133. Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 111, at 39-41 (analyzing psychological causes
of the anchoring effect and status quo bias).
134. See TUROW, supra note 10, at 59-60 (observing, in his autobiographical account of his
first year of law school, "I . . . never resisted that sensation of being taken, overwhelmed. . . . I
had the perpetual and elated sense that I was moving toward the solution of riddles which had
tempted me for years.").
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the facts of the case or one of the judge emphasizing the role of social,
economic, and ideological factors in deciding cases.
After three to six weeks, the vast majority of professors who began with
intentional torts move on to negligent torts for most of the remainder of the
semester. If time allows, they may discuss strict liability torts at the end.1 5
The Franklin, Rabin, and Green casebook, almost certainly the most widely-
used of the casebooks beginning with negligent torts, proceeds through an
exploration of strict liability torts and, at the end, intentional torts.136 After a
period of time, those professors who initially taught strict liability torts turn
their attention to negligent torts and then intentional torts.' By the end of
the semester, most students will have been exposed, to a greater or lesser
extent, to all three categories of tort liability. However, the anchoring
phenomenon led us to hypothesize that the tort student's initial
understanding of the judicial role, influenced by the category of tort cases
first studied, would persist throughout the first semester even after exposure
to other categories of tort liability.
III. SURVEY OF FIRST-SEMESTER TORTS STUDENTS
In this Part, we describe the survey we conducted of first-semester torts
students during the Fall semester 201 1,138 the methodology used to analyze
the data,'39 and the results of the survey.14 0
135. E.g., the Prosser Torts Casebook begins with intentional torts (pages 17-132), and
then spends five chapters exploring various aspects of negligence (pages 133-712), before
turning to strict liability torts (pages 713-863). PROSSER TORTS CASEBOOK, supra note 42.
Similarly, Epstein begins with intentional torts (pages 3-75) and provides an overview of the
history of strict liability and negligence (pages 77-143), before moving on to negligence (pages
145-589), and finally addressing strict liability (pages 591-841). EPSTEIN TORTS CASEBOOK,
supra note 42.
136. FRANKLIN, RABIN & GREEN, supra note 49. The Franklin, Rabin & Green casebook
begins with an introduction (pages 1-29), and then covers negligence (pages 30-128), strict
liability (pages 507-896), and finally, intentional torts (pages 897-1286).
137. For example, the Shulman, James, Gray & Gifford casebook begins with an
introductory chapter containing Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911) (holding a
workers' compensation act creating liability without fault to be unconstitutional) and the history
of the common law (pages 1-48), before covering strict liability torts (pages 49-130),
negligence (pages 131-557), and, finally, intentional torts (pages 763-842). SHULMAN &JAMES,
TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 54.
138. See infra Part III.A.
139. See infra Part III.B.
140. See infra Part III.C.
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A. Survey Design and Sample Characteristics
The data set employed in our analysis is a compilation of survey research
data collected from more than 450 first-year law students at eight law
schools during the Fall 2011 semester. Participating students attended the
University of Colorado School of Law, the Georgetown University Law
Center, the University of Maryland Carey School of Law, the New York
University School of Law, the St. Thomas University (Florida) School of
Law, the University of Toledo College of Law, the Wake Forest University
School of Law, and the University of Wisconsin Law School.
The students were surveyed at three different points during their first
semester of law school. We asked the fifteen participating professors to
encourage their students to complete the voluntary survey available online
through the SurveyMonkey® website. The first survey was administered
during the first week of the semester. We re-administered the survey to
students following the first six weeks of their respective Torts classes. We
designated this point in the semester to administer the second set of surveys
because we believed that most professors would have concluded their study
of any introductory material, as well as the first of the three areas of tort
liability, i.e., intentional, negligent, or strict liability torts. The final survey
was administered during the last week of classes.
The substantive portion of our survey consisted of six statements to
which the participating students were instructed to respond by
characterizing how much they agreed or disagreed with each statement. The
responses were classified within an ordinal Likert scale of values.14 ' The
available response values ranged from 1 to 5, with 1 representing "strongly
disagree," 2 representing "disagree somewhat," 3 representing "neither
agree nor disagree," 4 representing "agree somewhat," and 5 representing
"strongly agree." The statements appeared, in order, as follows:
1. The role of the judge is to apply a set of legal rules and
definitions to the facts of the case at issue.
2. If two courts disagree on the same legal issue, then one of
them is wrong.
3. Legal rules and definitions are more important in determining
whether a victim should recover than is the judge's own sense
of what is fair in a particular case.
141. Likert scales are designed to quantify measures that are otherwise fundamentally
qualitative, such as feelings and attitudes. Likert scales will typically allow for survey
participants to express a spectrum of possible response values.
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4. In deciding whether to apply a rule or definition to the case
before the court, the judge is likely to consider social,
economic, and/or ideological factors.
5. In practice, most judges use the law to support decisions on
the basis of their own sense of fairness.
6. In practice, most judges use the law to further their own social,
economic, and/or ideological objectives.
We also prompted each respondent to indicate her or his gender. For the
three surveys, female students produced a total of 566 survey responses,
while male students accounted for a total of 657 survey responses.
For the purposes of our analysis, the eight schools where students
participated were classified into three "groups" that we created based on the
2012 law school rankings published by U.S. News and World Report.14 2
Despite our use of these rankings, we do not necessarily endorse either the
methodology used by U.S. News and World Report to establish such
rankings or the importance often granted to such rankings. However, for our
limited purposes, these groupings appeared appropriate to test the
proposition that the balance of policies and rules taught in the Torts
classroom is more a function of the reputation of a school, the academic
credentials of its aggregate student body, or even differences in the
pedagogical objectives of faculty members depending upon the stature of
the school than it is a function of topic sequence. Group 1 consisted of the
Georgetown University Law Center and the New York University School of
Law and produced a total of 519 survey responses. Group 2 was composed
of the University of Colorado School of Law, the University of Maryland
Carey School of Law, the University of Wisconsin Law School, and Wake
Forest University School of Law. The students of Group 2 schools produced
a total of 525 survey responses. Group 3 included the St. Thomas
University School of Law and the University of Toledo College of Law and
produced 179 survey responses.
The students who participated in the surveys did so anonymously, and
the survey questions remained identical during the three administrations.
142. For methodological purposes, the classification of participating schools into "groups"
should be construed as ordinal coding (reflecting the relative U.S. News and World Report
rankings of the schools) as opposed to categorical coding. The use of the term "tier" to identify
these groupings would have been more methodologically proper from a social science
perspective, but we did not want readers to confuse our groupings with the "Tier" assignments
provided by U.S. News and World Report in its annual school rankings.
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B. Analysis
Our objective was to model the students' attitudinal shifts in their
understanding of the judge's role in common law adjudication that occur
during their first semester of law school. We drafted the six stimulus
statements listed above with this objective in mind. We analyzed the
responses to all six statements together. To do this, we created an index
score measurement that represented the aggregated response values for all
six statements. The first three statements were expected to produce lower
Likert scale response values in policy-oriented students, while the final
three statements would produce higher response values. To devise a scale in
which a Likert score of I = rule-oriented and a Likert score of 5 = policy-
oriented for all six questions, we reversed the scale for questions 1-3 so that
it matched the direction of the scale for questions 4-6.143
In our analysis, we used ANOVA (analysis of variance), a form of
statistical hypothesis testing to determine whether any differences in the
survey responses from various groupings of respondents were unlikely to
have occurred by chance alone, thus suggesting correlation in a statistically
significant manner.1' During our analysis, we conducted both simple
ANOVA tests, in which a single variable is tested for significant differences
between samples, and two-way ANOVA tests, which evaluate the effects of
two variables such as topic sequencing and school group.
C. Results
1. The Effect of Topic Sequence upon Index Scores
Our entire sample on average produced an increase in the Index Score
from the pre-semester survey to the end-of-semester survey. This indicates
143. Because (1) not all of the students completed both the pre-semester and the later two
surveys and (2) student anonymity prevented us from matching the answers for the later surveys
with the answers for the pre-semester survey, we replaced the pre-semester response for each
student respondent with the mean pre-semester response for that class.
144. ANOVA is conducted by calculating F, which is the ratio of estimated variance
between separate samples to the estimated variance within the samples. If F is sufficiently high,
it indicates that the variable being evaluated has a significant effect. The F-statistic is considered
sufficiently high when the statistical probability value (p) is extremely low. The p-value
represents the percentage probability that the difference in response values is produced by
chance or random errors. For example, a p < 0.05 means that the probability that the difference
of the means for two classes due to chance is less than five percent. A p-value of 0.10
approaches statistical significance. Our analyses concluded statistical significance when p-
values were less than 0.05.
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that after a full semester of torts, students were more likely to acknowledge
the influence of social, economic, and ideological factors and fairness in the
judging process and were less likely to see the judge's role as one of rule-
application. When broken into three groups on the basis of which category
of torts the students studied first-i.e., intentional, negligent, or strict
liability torts- each group produced an increase in average Index Score.
Figure 1. ANOVA of Change in Index Scores by Topic Sequence
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However, an application of ANOVA to the changes in the average Index
Scores for the three groups of students, without controlling for any other
variables, indicates that the average increases among the groups differed
significantly from one another.145 The greatest increase was produced by the
students who were first exposed to strict liability. Students enrolled in
courses that began with intentional torts produced the next-highest increase
in average Index Score. Students who were first introduced to negligent
torts accounted for the smallest increase in average Index Score. These
145. The F-test statistic quantifying this difference was 3.32, which attained a probability
level of p = 0.036. See supra note 144.
12745:0097]
128 ARIZONA STATE LAWJOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J.
results suggest that topic sequence represents a determinative factor in first-
semester students' changing attitudes regarding the roles played by policy
and fairness in adjudication.
2. The Effect of Topic Sequence with Control for School Group
We informally observed that, at least among the schools in our sample, a
much higher proportion of students in Group 3 schools began their study of
torts with intentional torts than with either negligent or strict liability torts.
This suggested the possibility that the greater shift toward an understanding
of the judicial role as policy-oriented found among students who began their
study with strict liability torts might result from other differences in the
educational approach at higher-ranked schools, or even from the
composition of the student body and their past educational backgrounds.
Figure 2a. TIER 1: ANOVA of Chance in Index Scores by Topic
Sequence and School Group
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Figure 2b. TIER 2: ANOVA of Chance in Index Scores by Topic
Sequence and School Group
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Accordingly, our next step was to examine whether the school group
variable offered any explanatory power for our initial ANOVA results.
However, we were limited in this statistical application by the fact that our
Group 3 schools did not include any students that began their semesters
with strict liability torts. Therefore, only Groups 1 and 2 were compared.
The multivariatel 46 ANOVA, which evaluated the effect of topic
sequence while also controlling for the school group variable, produced
noteworthy findings. Even with school group controlled, topic sequence still
generated a significant effect on students' perceptions of the role of the
common law judge.147 The students' school grouping, however, did not
generate a separate net effect, meaning that the effect produced by topic
sequence did not vary in a statistically significant way depending upon the
146. A multivariate analysis is one that analyzes data while taking into account more than
one variable.
147. F= 5.485, p = 0.004. See also supra note 144.
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students' school group.148 Among both Group 1 and Group 2 students, the
greatest increase in average Index Score was observed among students who
studied strict liability first. We found the lowest increase among students
who studied negligence first, with the increase in the average Index Score
for intentional torts students falling in between the other two groups.14 9
3. The Effects of Topic Sequence With Control for Gender
Figure 3a. MALES: ANOVA of Chance in Index Scores by Topic
Sequence and Gender
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148. F= 0.016, p = 0.901. See also supra note 144.
149. We found that the average student Index Scores from each of the three assigned
groups increased from the pre-semester survey to the post-semester survey. Notably, Group 1
schools produced the highest average Index Scores of the three groups for both pre-semester
and post-semester surveys. However, the degree of increase in the average Index Scores found
in the aggregated responses to all six questions did not vary significantly among any of the three
groups. Consequently, our data suggest that school ranking by itself does not have a significant
effect on the attitudinal shifts of first-year torts students. This absence of effect produced by the
school group variable further substantiates the existence of a topic sequence effect.
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Figure 3b.
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FEMALES: ANOVA of Chance in Index Scores by Topic
Sequence and Gender
Next, we investigated whether gender may play a role in determining
student responses to the stimulus statements. The effect of topic sequence
with the gender control proved significant again.' The effect of topic
sequence did not vary by gender, suggesting that topic sequence exerts a
similar effect on female and male students. The relative order of the degree
of change is also affirmed in Figures 3a and 3b: for both females and males,
strict liability-first students produced the greatest average Index Score
increase, followed by intentional torts-first students, and then finally by
negligence-first students.
CONCLUSION
The survey results support our hypothesis that students who begin their
study of torts with strict liability experience a greater shift toward
understanding the judge's role as being influenced by social, economic, and
150. F = 3.221, p = 0.040. See also supra note 144.
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ideological factors and a sense of fairness and less as a process of rule
application than do students who begin their study with either intentional
torts or negligence.15 1 Moreover, a control for school tier placed on a portion
of our sample produced results that indicate that the differences in
attitudinal shifts may be more pronounced in students from higher-ranked
schools.
We were surprised to find that our data suggested that students who
begin with intentional torts experience a greater attitudinal shift toward
perceiving the judicial role as being policy-influenced than do students who
begin with negligent torts. Perhaps many first-semester law students find
that when tort law holds defendants liable for intentional wrongdoing or for
the kinds of egregious ("abnormally dangerous") activities justifying the
application of strict liability principles, the results reflect the outcomes they
would have expected when they entered law school-outcomes reflecting
their own personal sense of fairness and their own judgment premised on
their analysis of social, economic, and ideological factors not yet
constrained by legal rules. In contrast, the fundamental principles of
negligence law developed during a time when tort law was evolving in a
pro-defendant direction. In large part, judges created the more specific rules
and doctrines of negligence law precisely to enable them to keep cases out
of the hands of jurors, who, like beginning law students, often had both a
strong sense of fairness and their own ideas about social, economic, and
ideological concerns.
We recognize that students take other first-semester courses concurrently
with Torts and that these courses will inevitably affect their understandings
of the judicial process. However, this does not detract from the findings of
this study. If anything, the finding that a single factor, the choice of
sequencing in a particular course, affects in a statistically significant way
how different groups of students taught by fifteen professors at eight
different schools perceive the role of judges in deciding cases suggests that
the influence of topic-sequencing in Torts is even more potent than it
otherwise might seem.
We acknowledge that correlation between topic sequence and students'
perceptions of the nature of the judicial role is not necessarily accompanied
by causation. It could be that professors who choose casebooks beginning
with strict liability torts are those who would teach a more policy-oriented
course regardless of which category of tort liability appeared first in the
151. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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casebooks they adopt. 152 We also tried to avoid normative conclusions-no
doubt with only limited success. For the few law graduates who practice
cutting edge tort law, say parens patriae litigation against tobacco
companies or lead pigment producers, understanding the interplay between
tort doctrine and policy is critical. But for graduates whose practices consist
of more routine types of tort cases such as auto accidents and slip-and-fall
claims,153 at least in most instances, the application of rules and doctrines
more accurately characterizes their professional milieus.
In any event, the sociological and cognitive psychological theories of
framingl5 and anchoring,155 as well as the results of our survey,156 support
our hypothesis that topic sequence in legal education matters. Only a much
more ambitious study could determine for sure whether this effect survives
the remaining five semesters of law school and students' other experiences
in becoming lawyers.
Sequencing choices are not unique to Torts courses. For example, should
Civil Procedure courses begin with jurisdiction or with the rules of civil
procedure? Should Constitutional Law begin with governance issues or with
civil liberties?' Should Contracts begin with damages, consideration, or
152. We considered conducting an additional survey of the professors whose students we
surveyed and attempting to hold constant for professors' expressed pedagogical goals, but
decided against it out of concern for reliability.
153. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, TRENDS IN TORT
LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE STATISTICS 30-31 (1987) (describing "[r]outine personal
injury torts" as "epitomize[d]" by auto suits that occur frequently and usually "involve relatively
modest injuries and small amounts of money"); Deborah R. Hensler, Reading the Tort
Litigation Tea Leaves: What's Going On in the Civil Liability System?, 16 JUST. SYS. J.
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 139, 147 (1993) (describing "[o]rdinary" tort filings as "personal injury cases
not involving products liability"); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the
Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1185 n.114
(1992) (noting that auto accidents are "the area with the highest claiming rate").
154. See supra Part II.A.
155. See supra Part II.B.
156. See supra Part III.C.
157. At least one sequencing choice within a constitutional law casebook became part of a
larger and more contentious debate. Compare Randy E. Bamett, Are Enumerated Constitutional
Rights the Only Rights We Have? The Case of Associational Freedom, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 101, 106 (1987) (suggesting that Gerald Gunther, editor of a classic Constitutional Law
casebook that Barnett had studied as a student, helped to re-legitimate substantive due process,
which had long lingered in academic disgrace after its use in early twentieth century cases to
strike down regulatory economic legislation, by pairing it in the casebook with more recent
cases striking down restrictions on women's reproductive rights), with Randy E. Barnett, What's
So Wicked About Lochner?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 325 (2005) (reporting Gunther's response
that his intent had not been to revitalize substantive due process but to undermine the reasoning
of the reproductive rights cases!). This story highlights another example of how a casebook
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offer and acceptance? Although these issues are often debated, no one has
studied the subliminal impact of such choices on students' understanding of
broader principles of the law. Those studies, like this one, are overdue.
Although there is much that remains to be studied, this Article sends a
powerful message: The most important lessons taught in the law school
classroom are not the substantive principles-whether rules or policies-we
intend to teach. First-semester torts professors teach lessons more
fundamental than either the elements of battery or the policies that courts
consider when deciding whether an activity is abnormally dangerous and
therefore strict liability applies. Whether we fully appreciate it or not, what
we teach the next generation of lawyers and judges subliminally, through
factors such as our choice of topic sequence, significantly affects their
understanding of how the common law judge functions within a democratic
but constantly changing society.
editor's juxtaposition of opinions within a casebook had important, albeit unintended,
consequences on students' perceptions of the law.
